Sharing my critique of Fukuyama’s thesis:

Francis Fukuyama, known for his grand pronouncements on the trajectory of history, claims that Donald Trump’s rise signifies a backlash against classical liberalism. To put it bluntly: not so fast, Francis. This interpretation is not only simplistic, but it also misses the elephant in the room. Trump’s rise isn’t about voters rejecting liberalism—it’s about voters rejecting the Left’s betrayal of it. What we’re witnessing isn’t the death of liberalism; it’s a rebellion against the Left’s abandonment of liberal principles for a newer, shinier, illiberal ideology cloaked in the language of social justice.

Classical liberalism is built on a foundation of universal rights, individual freedom, free speech, and respect for the rule of law. But let’s face it: these values have become increasingly alien on the modern Left. Instead of championing equality under the law, the Left now obsesses over equity—a buzzword that replaces opportunity with outcomes and individual merit with group identity.

Take free speech, for example. Classical liberalism holds it sacred, a cornerstone of open societies. Yet, the Left has embraced a culture of censorship—de-platforming dissenters, labeling speech as "harmful," and redefining disagreement as violence. If you think this doesn’t alienate people, you’re not paying attention. This is why many voters, even those who once leaned Left, now see liberalism’s torch being carried not by progressives, but by those standing against them.

Now, Fukuyama is partially right when he says Trump’s rise stems from economic discontent. Neoliberal policies have left working-class voters feeling betrayed, and they’ve had enough of being ignored. But the real kicker? It’s not just about economics. It’s about culture—specifically, the Left’s smug cultural authoritarianism.

The Left has traded its traditional focus on bread-and-butter issues for an endless parade of identity politics and moral posturing. Diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives may make academics and HR departments cheer, but to many Americans, these efforts feel like ideological policing. The working class—the supposed heart of the Left’s coalition—now sees itself left behind in favor of elite cultural battles. And guess who swoops in to capitalize on this? Trump, with his promise to restore “common sense” and stand up to the woke elites.

Let’s address the elephant—or the populist—in the room. Trump isn’t a textbook classical liberal. He’s brash, impulsive, and often undermines the norms that liberalism holds dear. But here’s the twist: for many voters, his populism is less about rejecting liberalism and more about defending it from what they see as an existential threat.

Consider Trump’s policies. Deregulation and tax cuts? Pure economic liberalism. Support for religious liberty? That’s classical liberalism in action. His judicial appointments? Designed to limit government overreach and preserve constitutional norms. Yes, his rhetoric can be abrasive, but for his supporters, he’s a blunt instrument wielded against a Left they feel has turned its back on freedom, pluralism, and reason.

Here’s where Fukuyama really drops the ball: he ignores the Left’s illiberal transformation. The rise of what many call "wokeism" represents a fundamental shift from the universal principles of liberalism to a hyper-focus on group identity, power dynamics, and equity over equality. This shift, rooted in critical theory, has led to:

Equity over merit: Individual achievement is now subordinate to group-based outcomes.

Conformity over pluralism: Dissent is no longer a virtue; it’s a crime.

These trends are what voters are reacting to—not the liberalism of John Stuart Mill, but the illiberalism of campus activists and bureaucratic ideologues. Trump’s supporters see themselves not as enemies of liberalism, but as its last line of defense.

Fukuyama’s framing of Trump’s rise as a rejection of classical liberalism is a misdiagnosis. Populism, while messy and imperfect, isn’t inherently illiberal. In fact, it often arises when liberal institutions fail to live up to their promises. Trump’s populism is less about dismantling liberalism than about reclaiming it from elites who have strayed from its principles.

The real story isn’t that voters have turned against liberalism—it’s that they no longer see the Left as its standard-bearer. When the Left focuses on equity over opportunity, identity over individualism, and censorship over debate, it’s no wonder that populists like Trump gain traction. For many, he represents not a break from liberalism, but a recalibration of it.

Fukuyama is wrong to see Trump as the death knell of classical liberalism. Instead, Trump’s rise is better understood as a rebellion—a rebellion against a Left that has abandoned liberal values for illiberal ideologies. Voters aren’t rejecting freedom, reason, or pluralism. They’re rejecting the Left’s betrayal of these ideals.

Trump’s populism isn’t the antithesis of liberalism; it’s a flawed, often clumsy effort to defend it. To restore liberalism, we don’t need less Trump—we need a Left that remembers what liberalism actually means. Until then, expect the backlash to continue. As the saying goes, those who abandon their principles shouldn’t be surprised when others pick them up.